



**Los Angeles County
Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk**

Election Observation Program

June 2, 2026 STATEWIDE SPECIAL ELECTION

LAVOTE.GOV

JUNE 2, 2026 STATEWIDE SPECIAL ELECTION

<i>Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk:</i>	Dean C. Logan Office Phone: (562) 462-2716
<i>Chief Deputy:</i>	Jerome Jordan Office Phone: (562) 462-2652
<i>Outreach and Election Observation:</i>	Michael Sanchez Office Phone: (562) 462-2648 Lia Kolangian Office Phone: (562) 562-345-8368
<i>Voting System:</i>	Voting Solutions for All People (VSAP) 3.0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Purpose of Election Observer Panel	3
General Information	3-5
Election Observer Rights and Conduct	5-6
Check-in-Center Observation	6
Vote Center Observation	6-7
Ballot Processing Center Observation	7-15
Challenging Procedures	8

ATTACHMENTS

- Public Observation Rules and Guidelines **A**
- Election Observer Questions and Comments Form **B**
- Election Observer Challenge Form **C**
- Election Observer Acknowledgement Form **D**

PURPOSE OF THE ELECTION OBSERVATION PROGRAM

- To provide a means for public observation of the election process.
- Maintain the integrity of the election process.
- Encourage participation and build voter confidence in the election process.

GENERAL INFORMATION

Election Observers are afforded access to Vote Centers, Check-in Centers, and the Ballot Processing Center to observe voting and election procedures. However, this right must be exercised responsibly and professionally to avoid disrupting the voting process and experience. These guidelines outline the rights and responsibilities of individuals from the public who observe the election process, including a list of policies and actions in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, including the California Elections Code.

The RR/CC will also livestream observable operations at the Ballot Processing Center. Livestream feeds will be available at LAVOTE.GOV. Although there are remote observation opportunities, no challenges will be accepted remotely. All challenges must be made in person and in writing.

Failure to follow these guidelines or the instructions of the election officials may result in an observer being asked to leave the premises.

POINTS OF OBSERVATION

Pre-Election Day

- Before scanning begins, Logic & Accuracy testing is conducted of the voting system to verify its readiness for the central count of Vote by Mail (VBM) and in-person ballots.
- VBM operations: Incoming ballots, automated signature verification, manual signature verification, ballot extraction, ballot remakes, and ballot preparation for the tally.
- Processing provisional and conditional voter registration ballots received at Vote Centers.

Voting Period & Election Night

- VBM operations: Incoming ballots, automated signature verification, manual signature verification, ballot extraction, ballot remakes, and ballot preparation for the tally.
- Processing provisional and conditional voter registration ballots received at Vote Centers.
- Opening and closing of Vote Centers and voting activities.
- Ballot transportation and delivery at Check-in Centers.
- Ballot intake, preparation, and storage.

- Vote tally and reporting on Election Night.

Canvass Period

- Processing provisional and conditional voter registration ballots received at Vote Centers.
- Processing VBM ballots returned by Election Day and received within seven (7) days from Election Day.
- Ballot remake and processing of write-in ballots.
- Ballot Review and Adjudication.
- Conducting the 1% Manual Tally Audit.
- Conduct Logic & Accuracy testing on the voting system following election certification.

DEFINITIONS

- **Automated Signature Recognition (ASR):** A technology used to compare the signature on a returned Vote by Mail ballot envelope with the voter's signature on file.
- **Ballot Curing:** The process by which voters can resolve or "cure" issues with their submitted ballot, such as a missing or mismatched signature.
- **Ballot Drop Box:** Secured boxes installed throughout the County in which voters can return their VBM ballots.
- **Ballot Marking Device (BMD):** Device used by voters to view, mark, print and cast a paper ballot.
- **Ballot Processing Center (BPC):** Facility where voted ballots are received, processed and tabulated.
- **Ballot Security Envelope (BSE):** A secure, tamper-evident envelope used to transport Vote by Mail ballots dropped off at a Vote Center.
- **Ballot Transport Box (BTB):** Boxes used during various periods of ballot processing to secure and transport BMD and VBM ballots.
- **Batches:** Groups of ballots processed together to streamline counting, tracking, and auditing procedures.
- **Conditional Voter Registration (CVR) Ballot:** A ballot cast by voters who registered to vote during the voting period at a Vote Center.
- **Election Management System (EMS):** System used by staff to enter and update voter records, including voting history.
- **Endorsed:** A ballot marked by an elections official indicating the ballot has met the necessary requirements for processing or counting.
- **Provisional Ballot:** A ballot cast at a Vote Center by voters whose eligibility must be verified.

- **Security Bag:** A secure, tamper-evident bag used to transport Vote by Mail ballots collected from Ballot Drop Boxes.
- **Staff:** Staff of the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk

ELECTION OBSERVER RIGHTS

Election Observers have the right to observe voting and election-related processes, as well as challenge election-related processes, so long as those actions do not interfere with or disrupt election activity or process. Election Observers have the right to submit challenges in writing to designated RR/CC staff using a form that will be made available by RR/CC. The RR/CC shall document and resolve these challenges as provided in 2 CCR § 20879(h). Upon the resolution of a challenge, the RR/CC shall provide the Election Observer with an oral or written disposition of the challenge as soon as is reasonably practicable. At the discretion of the RR/CC, submitted challenges may be reviewed at a later time to maintain the integrity of the election process and to prevent disruption of the processing of VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes or interference with the conduct of the election activity. The RR/CC must ensure that no confidential voter registration information is disclosed when providing the disposition of the challenge.

CONDUCT OF ELECTION OBSERVERS

To minimize distraction or disruption, an Elections Observer shall not:

- Interfere with or assist in the (1) retrieval of VBM ballots from Ballot Drop Box locations, processing of VBM ballot Return Envelopes, or the processing and counting of VBM ballots; and (2) conduct of the election in general or disrupt any other election activity or process.
- Touch any ballots, voting equipment, voting materials, or election employees.
- Engage in any electioneering activities.
- Display any political party or campaign material or wear political party or campaign badges, buttons, or apparel.
- Wear the uniform of a peace officer, a private guard, or security personnel.
- Eat or drink in a Vote Center or the Ballot Processing Center (BPC).
- Intentionally prevent other election observers from observing election materials or an election process or activity.
- Enter any area other than an identified observation area without the express permission of the election official.
- Engage in any conduct perceived to be intimidating to voters or election workers.

Refer to the RR/CC's Observation Rules and Guidelines for additional information.

OBSERVATION AT A CHECK-IN CENTER (CIC)

OBSERVER CHECK-IN AND PROCEDURES:

- Public observation commences Saturday, May 23, 2026 (E-10), for in-person voting operations and continues through Election Day, June 2, 2026.
- Upon arrival, observers must check in with the CIC Chief. During the first 10 days of the in-person voting period, observers must check in at the CIC by 6:30 PM, and on Election Day by 7:30 PM.
- The CIC Chief will provide a badge that must be worn at all times while observing activities at the CIC. All questions concerning procedures must be directed to the CIC Chief.
- If an established procedure is not being followed, observers may notify the CIC Chief and use the Election Observer Questions and Comments Form to record the nature of the election procedure issue.
- The report must include the CIC number, the time of the incident, and as much detail as possible relevant to the election procedure issue.
- Weapons are strictly prohibited.

OBSERVATION AT A VOTE CENTER

Vote Center locations and hours are listed on LAVOTE.GOV before every election.

OBSERVER CHECK-IN AND PROCEDURES:

- Public observation commences Saturday, May 23, 2026, for in-person voting and continues through Election Day, June 2, 2026.
- Observer participation may begin during Vote Center set-up, from 9:00 AM – 10:00 AM during the first ten days of in-person voting, and from 6:00 AM – 7:00 AM on Election Day.
- The purpose is to observe the voting process. Observers may not talk to Election Workers while voters or ballots are being processed.
- Touching or handling of any ballots and election materials is strictly prohibited.
- It is prohibited to engage in any electioneering activities within 100 feet of an entrance to a Vote Center.
- It is prohibited to converse with voters within 25 feet of an entrance to a Vote Center regarding the casting of a vote or voter qualifications.
- An observer's actions must not interfere with the processing of voters or cause voters to feel intimidated.
- If an observer's actions are perceived to be intimidating to voters or obstructive to the voting process, they will be asked to leave.
- Weapons are strictly prohibited.

- The public, including observers, may not challenge any voter.
- Questions concerning Vote Center procedures or challenges should be directed to the Vote Center Lead.

OBSERVATION AT THE BALLOT PROCESSING CENTER (BPC)

Location: 13401 Crossroads Parkway N., City of Industry, CA 91746

CHECK-IN AND PROCEDURES:

Sign-In & Identification:

- Observers must always sign in, review the rules and guidelines, and wear an Election Observer Badge.

Escort Requirement:

- Except for the enclosed Tally Room perimeter, an Election Observer Coordinator escort is always required while in the observation areas.

Prohibited Actions:

- Observers cannot assist in any of the election operations.
- Observers cannot touch, disturb, or interfere with RR/CC personnel.
- Observers cannot touch or handle any ballots, election supplies, or equipment.
- The use of electronic devices (cell phones, tablets, laptops, etc.) is prohibited on the observation floor of the BPC.
- Food and beverages are prohibited in observation areas, adjacent hallways, or lobbies.
- Weapons are strictly prohibited.

Electronic Devices & Personal Items:

- Electronic devices are only permitted in the lobby area of the BPC or outside the BPC.
- All electronic devices should be silenced or set to vibrate.
- Taking photos and videos is prohibited on the observation floor.
- All bags and personal belongings are prohibited on the operation floor and should be left in a vehicle.

Conduct & Behavior:

- Observers may take notes with pen and paper.

- Observers cannot wear the uniform of a peace officer, private guard, security personnel, or clothing and accessories that promote candidates, parties, or campaigns (including campaign badges and buttons).
- Observers must maintain a three (3) foot distance from the observed activity or personnel.
- Sitting is not available in observation areas; however, observers may leave and return at leisure.
- Conversations should be kept to a minimum while in observation areas.

CHALLENGE PROCEDURES

- Observers can challenge the manner in which ballots are handled and whether established processes and procedures are followed.
- Election Observers may submit challenges in writing to designated RR/CC staff using a form that will be made available by RR/CC.
- The RR/CC shall document and resolve these challenges as provided in 2 CCR § 20879(h).
- Upon the resolution of a challenge, the RR/CC shall provide the Election Observer with an oral or written disposition of the challenge as soon as is reasonably practicable.
- Because the voter is not present, the challenger will have the burden of establishing “extraordinary proof of the validity of the challenge” at the time the challenge is made. Doubts in the interpretations of the law must be “liberally construed in favor of the voter.” (Elec. Code §§3000, 15106.)
- RR/CC has discretion to determine the distance at which the observer shall observe the Ballot Identification Envelope process, so long as the observer remains “sufficiently close.”
- RR/CC may halt challenges from a person or group if multiple challenges are being made by the same person or group, or if the challenges appear frivolous or meritless, and the challenges are disrupting the processing of Ballot Identification Envelopes. If challenges are halted for these reasons, the challenging person or group has the right to submit written challenges.
- RR/CC has the discretion to determine what constitutes observer misconduct or interference and to take necessary steps to maintain the integrity of the election process.
- RR/CC has the discretion to review challenges submitted reviewed at a later time to prevent disruption with the processing of Ballot Identification Envelopes or interference with the conduct of the election activity, or to maintain the integrity of the election process.
- The RR/CC may also limit the number of election observers permitted in an observation area to prevent interference with the election processes. (2 CCR §§ 20874a, 20874g.)

A WRITTEN CHALLENGE MAY BE SUBMITTED AS FOLLOWS:

1. A challenge must be made prior to the opening of the Ballot Identification Envelope pertaining to the challenge.
2. The observer must notify designated RR/CC staff of their intent to submit a challenge and the reason for the challenge.
3. The observer completes and signs the challenge form to be provided by RR/CC.
4. The challenger shall have the burden of providing extraordinary proof of the validity of the challenge at the time the challenge is made.
5. RR/CC shall determine whether the challenge will be allowed and provide the observer with an oral or written disposition of the challenge as soon as is reasonably practicable. Such determination shall be final

OBSERVABLE ELECTION PROCESSES

VOTE BY MAIL (VBM) OPERATIONS

Eight (8) VBM operations are available for observation. Signage will be placed throughout the work areas to identify the observation areas.

1. Incoming VBM Ballots

- a. VBM Ballots returned by mail are picked up daily at the United States Postal Service (USPS) and transported to the BPC.
- b. VBM Ballots returned in a Ballot Drop Box are picked up daily by staff and delivered in sealed security bags.
- c. VBM Ballots returned at a Vote Center are delivered in a Ballot Security Envelope by staff during the in-person voting period.

2. Ballot Preparation

- a. **USPS:** VBM Ballots returned by mail are sorted into three (3) categories:
 - i. **With Signature:** Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes with a signature are placed in a mail tray and ready for verification. Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes with signatures are organized onto carts and labeled by the return source and date.
 - ii. **Without Signature:** Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes without a signature are held for manual review and ballot curing.
 - iii. **Damaged:** Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes that are damaged or torn are manually reviewed.

b. Ballot Drop Box:

- i. Returned VBM Ballots are removed from the security bags and placed in trays with a routing slip (header card) corresponding to the drop box location.
 - ii. The header card is placed at the front of the tray.
- c. **Vote Center Drop Off:**
 - i. The Vote Center ID number on the Ballot Security Envelope (BSE) is matched to the placard displayed number on the BSE.
 - ii. Returned VBM Ballots dropped off at Vote Centers are removed from the BSE and placed in trays.

3. Automated Signature Verification

- a. Returned VBM Ballots, specifically the VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes, are re-checked to ensure there are no damaged envelopes or envelopes with missing signatures.
 - i. If an envelope is damaged or is missing a signature, it is placed back in the tray for manual review.
- b. Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes are loaded in batches into the automated signature recognition (ASR) device to endorse, scan each envelope, and verify the signature on each envelope.
- c. A label is printed and placed on the tray with each corresponding batch of scanned envelopes.
- d. Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes are re-checked to ensure that every envelope has been endorsed.
 - i. If an envelope is not endorsed, it will be re-scanned.
- e. Depending on status, Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes are deposited into specific bins after running through a machine for the first time.
 - i. Verified signature
 - ii. Unverified signature
 - iii. Exceptions: unverified due to voting history, registration status, or a missing signature
 - iv. Incorrect election
 - v. Unscannable or damaged envelope
- f. The Incoming Tray Report is printed for each batch of scanned Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes that lists all envelopes that are unverified based on signature or other exceptions.
- g. Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes and corresponding reports are placed in trays and organized in a cart for Data Processing.
- h. After the returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes are cleared by Data Processing, they are returned to the ASR device to audit and open them for Ballot Extraction.

4. Data Processing and Manual Signature Review

a. Verified Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes:

- i. These envelopes are ready for Ballot Extraction.

b. Incoming Tray Report (Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes unverified by signature):

- i. Staff will use the Election Management System (EMS) to select the election and enter the batch number provided.
- ii. Side-by-side images of signatures are retrieved and displayed from the batch:
 1. The voter's signature(s) on their registration record.
 2. The signature that was scanned on the ASR device.
- c. Staff will review the images and determine if they match.
- d. Envelopes with matching signatures are prepared to return to the ASR device for auditing and opening.
- e. If the signatures do not match, staff will check to see if the voter has multiple signatures on their record and determine if any one of those signatures matches the signature on the envelope.
- f. If the signature on the envelope does not match any signature on record or the signature image is missing, staff will highlight that on the report and proceed to a supervisor review.
- g. If the supervisor review determines the signatures do not match, the envelope will be held for ballot curing.
- h. Once the batch review is complete, staff will close it in the EMS and proceed with a new batch.
- i. **Incoming Tray Report (Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes unverified by exception):**
 - i. Staff will review the Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes identified in the Incoming Tray Report in accordance with regulations promulgated by the California Secretary of State (2 CCR § 20910 et seq.).
 - ii. If cleared, the envelopes are prepared to return to the ASR device for auditing and opening.
 - iii. If an envelope cannot be cleared, staff will challenge the envelopes in the EMS and route them for storage.

5. Ballot Extraction

a. Opening Verified VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes

- i. These envelopes are opened at the ASR device.

b. Counting Returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelopes

- i. Staff will receive a tray of verified envelopes and check each envelope for an endorsement date.
- ii. Staff will write the number of return envelopes in gold pencil on the Extraction Control Sheet.

c. Extracting the VBM Ballots

- i. Staff will handle one returned VBM Ballot Identification Envelope at a time and remove ballot cards from each envelope.
 1. The empty envelopes will be placed into the **blue box**.
- ii. Staff will inspect the ballots and place the ballot cards into one of three (3) boxes:
 1. **Green Box:** Ballot cards with no duplicate cards, the selections filled in completely, and not damaged.
 - a. These ballots are moved to Tally Preparation.
 2. **Yellow Box:** Ballot cards that need to be remade due to being damaged.
 - a. These ballots are sent to Ballot Remake.
 3. **Red Box:** Ballot cards with duplicates or two sets of ballot cards.
 - a. These ballots are sent for supervisor review.
- iii. Once staff complete their tray, they will write the number of envelopes in the Red Box and subtract it from the total number of envelopes received.

6. VBM Ballot Remake

- a. Staff will log in to the Ballot Remake System and enter their designated station code.
- b. Staff will scan the ballot style QR code on the ballot card, confirm the information (precinct, ballot type, card number, etc.) on the screen matches the ballot, and print new ballot cards.
- c. Once printed, the unique remake count number is applied to the top of the ballot.
- d. A Remake Control Sheet and Quality Check Sheet are completed for each batch of ballots.
- e. Both sets of ballots, the original and the remake, will be placed in the designed remake print station.
- f. Staff will retrieve the batches of original and remade ballots, review the Remake Control Sheet and Quality Check Sheet, and transfer the selected votes to the newly printed ballot using green highlighter pens.
- g. Once the batch is completed, staff will conduct a quality review check on the remade ballots.

- h. Once quality review staff confirm the selections are identical, the original ballot and remade ballot are separated.
- i. Staff will place remade ballots into a ballot box, apply an identified label, and seal the box for Tally Preparation.

7. Conditional Ballots and Provisional Ballots

- a. VBM Staff receives the provisional envelopes in BSEs and creates a transfer sheet.
- b. Data Entry Staff receives the provisional envelopes with the ballots and the transfer sheet, and confirms the quantity.
- c. Data Entry Staff researches the voter record and verifies eligibility based on voter registration status and voting history
- d. Data Entry Staff extracts verified ballots from the envelopes, completes the transfer sheet, and places them in boxes.
- e. Tally operations staff receive the transfer sheet and the verified ballots for tabulation.

8. Tally Preparation

- a. Staff inspect VBM Ballots again for damage and separate any miscellaneous materials.
- b. Ballots cleared for Tally are placed in a ballot box, labeled, and transported to the secure Pre-Tally Storage room.

TALLY OPERATIONS

There are five (5) Tally Operations available for observation. Each area will allow observers to view a specific part of the tally operations.

1. Receiving Ballot Transport Boxes (BTB)

- a. During the first ten (10) days of the in-person voting period, ballots cast in person at Vote Centers (In-person Ballots) are received in BTBs from CICs by staff.
- b. BTBs retrieved from CIC staff are inspected to ensure that tamper-evident seals remain intact.
- c. On Election Day, BTBs are retrieved from Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) authorized vehicles and inspected to ensure tamper-evident seals remain intact.
- d. BTBs delivered shall have a CIC route slip for tracking and chain of custody.

2. Entry Scan

- a. BTBs are scanned for tracking and chain of custody.
- b. All BTBs are counted and reconciled against the CIC route slip.
- c. BTBs are visually inspected and routed to Ballot Preparation.

3. Routing of BTB for Preparation

- a. BTBs are placed in carts and routed to the Ballot Preparation Section.
- b. During the 10-day in-person early voting period (E-10 through E-1), BTBs are stored and locked overnight in the BMD Pre-Tally Storage Room.
- c. BTBs are inventoried and documented using a carbon-copy receipt indicating the number of BTBs stored, which is placed inside the storage room.
- d. Staff reconcile the BTB inventory against the prior night's receipt the following morning before the start of BTB processing.
- e. BTBs received from Vote Centers on Election Day (E-0) are transported to the Ballot Preparation Section and processed by staff the same night.
- f. BTBs are properly sealed and placed in transport carts.
- g. Improperly sealed/unsealed BTBs are properly identified and routed for supervisor review.
- h. From E-10 through E-1, BTBs are carefully counted, verified, and recorded on a carbon copy receipt.
- i. Cart handlers follow a designated route for transporting BTBs to the Ballot Preparation Section.

4. BTB Preparation and Processing

- a. Each clerk station receives one (1) sealed BTB at a time.
- b. Clerks open and check the ballot statement included in BTB for quantities and ensure the statement seal number matches the number on the BTB seal.
- c. Clerks check all In-person Ballots for damages, wrinkles, alterations, and other potential defects before transferring them to the Tally Room.
- d. The seal on the BTB should not be broken/torn, or altered before reaching the Ballot Preparation clerk station.
- e. Damaged/defective ballot and miscellaneous items found in BTB are placed in a "Withheld Box" and stored for the Canvass section to review and validate.
- f. Once reviewed and prepared, In-person Ballots are repacked in Pre-Tally Transport Boxes and routed to the Tally Room.

5. Tally (BMD/In-person Ballots and VBM Ballots)

- a. Pre-Tally Transport Box runners follow a prescribed route to deliver VBM ballots and In-person Ballots to the Tally Room.
- b. Pre-Tally Transport Boxes are placed on a table for Tally staff to process.
- c. Pre-Tally Transport Boxes are inspected to ensure that the start and end box sheets match.
- d. Pre-Tally Transport Boxes are transported by Tally staff to a Tally Scanner.
- e. Ballots are taken out of the Pre-Tally Transport Boxes
- f. Tally Scan Operators scan ballots.
- g. Ballots are placed in secure ballot storage boxes, sealed, and securely stored.

- h. Starting at 8:00 pm on election night, the Tally system begins tabulating to report election results.
- i. Each Election Results Bulletin is numbered and time-stamped.

OFFICIAL ELECTION CANVASS

There are three (3) Official Canvass Operations available for observation. Each area will allow observers to view a specific part of the operation.

1. Write-In Ballots

- a. The Tally system displays ballot images filtered by write-in contests.
- b. Staff select the qualified write-in candidates and annotate all the vote selections on a tally sheet.
- c. Supervisors receive completed tally sheets for each contest, verify the vote totals for accuracy, and combine all the results of the tally sheets into a single report. This report is sent to a second supervisor for review.
- d. After the summary report is approved, staff create the Canvass Certificate of write-in results.

2. BMD Ballot Remake

- a. Damaged BMD ballots are received by a supervisor.
- b. Supervisor counts the ballots, prepares a report, and distributes them to staff.
- c. Staff remake the Ballots on the BMD machine and return the original and remade ballots to the supervisor for review.
- d. A supervisor receives the original and remade ballots and confirms the ID is correct. They create a transfer sheet and send the remade ballots to Tally.

3. 1% Manual Tally Audit

- a. Supervisor conducts a random selection of ballots to be manually tallied per state regulations.
- b. Ballot boxes corresponding to the random selection results are pulled from storage.
- c. Supervisors confirm the quantity of ballots in ballot boxes and assign boxes and tally sheets to staff.
- d. Staff sort the ballots by contest. They then count the ballots to confirm the number of ballots for the contest and then tally the ballots. They repeat this process for each contest in the ballot box. Once complete, the supervisor picks up the ballot boxes and the tally sheets.
- e. Supervisors review all tally sheets for accuracy.
- f. Staff enter the results into the tally database.
- g. Supervisors print and review the summary report and results of the Tally Audit and prepare the Tally Audit Report.